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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Section 78-2a-
3(2)(e) of the Utah Code Annotated, the Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over "appeals from a court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first degree felony or 
capital felony." 
Page 3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues requires consideration by the Court as a result of the May 18, 
2005 Order and Decision by the Honorable John C. Backlund, trial court judge. The 
ultimate legal question is whether Appellee, City of Orem (the "City"), acted illegally 
when it charged Appellant with violating a statute that was not in effect a the time of the 
alleged incident. Included within this review are the following issues: 
1. Did the legislature intend to make a change of effect in 41-6-53 when it reworded 
and renumbered 41-6-53 to 41-6a-701 in Senate Bill 5? 
2. Did the City uniformly enforce the law, in compliance with Article I, Section 24 of 
the Utah State Constitution, when it allowed other similarly situated defendants 
the protections of the newly enacted 6a revisions, but not the Appellant? 
3. Did the City violate the Appellant's Fourteenth Amendment rights when it failed 
to follow its own policies and procedures in charging Appellant under a statute not 
in force at the time of the alleged incident? 
4. Was the pro se defendant particularly prejudiced by prosecution under the wrong 
statute? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." 
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U n i t e d S*'»» 3 , F :: i i r teenth Amendment , Section 1 [Rights Guaranteed 
Privileges and Immunit ies of Citizenship, Due Process and Equal Protection] 
"All persons bo rn or naturalized in the United States and s u b j c , . i;.~ y~. *•-• 
IIHMVUI, i I / i i is i I ll (Initcil Sliid > ntiil of the Stnlr wherein they reside. N o 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immuni t ies of citizens of the Uni ted States; nor shall aii> State deprive any person 
within its jur isd ic t ion the equal protect ion of the laws." 
™
A
 ^ " E N T O F T H E C A S E 
was not in effect either on the date of the alleged incident or on the date of the trial. The 
Uni ted States Consti tut ion, the Utah State Constitution, and the weight of centuries of 
c o m m o n law include proviso u* a*, J ^ . . guage prohjunmg -i . s. 
11 in' 11 T( in i 1II i • judgment against the Appellant should be vacated. 
STATEMEP f i :: F RELEVANT FACTS 
Oil McUwii z$ . --JV vppeiiant was cited for " fail [sic] to stop at Police i oad 
\npel lant and the Prosecutor , 
KIr. Church, discussed the appropriate charge. The Appellant brought the 6a revisions to 
the attention of Mr. Chi irch, indicating also that the date of the offense was after the 
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revisions took effect (the 6a revisions took effect on February 2n , 2005). 
At the beginning of the trial on May 18th, 2005, Mr. Church moved to amend the 
charge to 41-6-53, and the judge granted this motion. See Transcript at f3, Line 13 
through TJ4, Line 5. After granting this motion, the Appellant correctly objected, stating 
that the actual statute number was 41-6a-701. See Transcript at ^4, Line 6 and 7. In the 
ensuing discussion, the judge asks the prosecutor if the statute takes effect after March 
28th, and the prosecutor agrees, despite Mr. Church and the Appellant's previous 
conversations on the subject and the fact that Mr. Church had at this point already 
prosecuted numerous offenses under the 6a revisions that occurred before the incident in 
question here. In addition, the original citation, which Mr. Church was amending, was 
for a violation of the 6a revisions, specifically 41-6a-904 (1) (a). 
The language from the 6a revision to 41-6-53 (under the new code section of 41-
6a-701) is substantially different. Included in the changes to the revised 6a are an 
exception that would specifically provide a defense in this case. This exception was not 
available in 41-6-53, but under the law in effect at the time of the incident, the 
Defendant's conduct is justified. The difficulties resulting from the different statutes can 
be seen in the discussion between Appellant, Mr. Church, and Hon. Judge Backlund as 
the judge is making his ruling. See Transcript at [^52, Line 18 through ^56, Line 14. 
Appellant at trial provided significant evidence that if an exception such as is 
allowed in 41-6a-701 (1) (b) was recognized, he would have come under that protection. 
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Included as evidence in this are the statements from the police officer (on direct 
examination by Mr. Church) that it looked like the police cars were positioned to direct 
traffic into the southbound lanes (see Transcript at f21, Line 10 through 13), video tape 
evidence (see Transcript at ^47, Line 23, through ^[51, Line 24), and further evidence 
from the police officer that the police repositioned the cones and cars to make it more 
clear what the police officers wanted drivers to do. See Transcript at [^30 Line 5 through 
19. The difficulty caused by the misunderstanding of the correct statute and appropriate 
exceptions available is seen in the actions of Hon. Judge Backlund to move past any 
discussion of the conditions in the southbound lanes. See Transcript at Tf27 Line 14 
through 16; and f^28 Line 3 and 4, Line 6 through 7, Line 13 through 14, and Line 20 and 
21. Without an exception in the statute, the judge is correct in his repeated assertions that 
the fact that those lanes are "southbound lanes" is conclusive. With such an exception, 
however, the condition of those southbound lanes becomes a key issue of fact. 
BASIC RULE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Under the most basic understanding of statutory interpretation, any change by the 
legislature of a statute is assumed to having meaning by the Court. If the legislature had 
wanted to ensure that 41-6-53 remained the same in effect, they could have simply 
renumbered it. The law must assume that the legislature is capable of not rewriting a 
statute, and therefore the presumption is that the legislature did intend to make a change 
in 41-6-53, and has in effect made a change in the resulting statute of 41-6a-701. 
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JUDGMENT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS 
Although the rights of defendants in civil traffic violations do not rise to the level 
of the rights of criminal defendants, civil traffic defendants do have protected rights of 
action and process. These include rights by the Utah State Constitution and the Federal 
Constitution. Because Appellant raised the issue of the proper statute at trial (even 
without the formal language of objection or exception), the standard is the lower standard 
of reversible error as opposed to manifest and prejudicial error. 
A. Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution Guarantees Uniform 
Application of Laws, and the Violation of These Rights in This Trial 
Represents Reversible Error 
Article I, Section 24 of the Utah State Constitution states that "[a]U laws of general 
nature shall have uniform operation." The Utah Supreme Court has shown that a 
violation of this standard is reversible error. State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (1995). In 
Mohi, the Supreme Court held that "Utah's uniform operation of laws provision 
establishes different requirements than does the federal Equal Protection Clause. The 
most important of these requirements, for the present analysis, is the requirement that "for 
a law to be constitutional under [the provision], it is not enough that it be uniform on its 
face. What is critical is that the operation of the law be uniform. A law does not operate 
uniformly if'persons similarly situated1 are not 'treated similarly1. . . . " Id.) (quoting 
Malan, 693 P.2d at 669)." Mohi at 37. 
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The uniform operations test established by the Utah Supreme Court has two parts. 
"First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory 
classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences 
that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute." Malan v. Lewis, 
693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 1984). If the actions of the state fail in either respect, it amounts 
to reversible error. 
The Utah Supreme Court established a pattern for examining such cases. "[W]e 
must first determine what classifications, if any, are created by the statute. Second, we 
must determine whether different classes or subclasses are treated disparately. Finally, if 
any disparate treatment exists between classes or subclasses, we must determine whether 
the legislature had any reasonable objective that warrants the disparity." Mohi at 44. 
In this case, the analysis is straightforward. The classification created by the 
statute are those cited for violation of this statute. A reasonable subclass for this 
classification is the Appellant. Presumably every other individual pulled over in the 
month of March for a similar infraction was charged under 41-6a-701, but Appellant was 
charged under 41-6-53. Considering that the legislature made the statutory change, it is 
difficult to imagine how this disparate treatment would have a reasonable objective that 
warrants the disparity. 
Because the actions of the State in this case fail the test established by the Utah 
Supreme Court in interpreting Article I, Section 24, the actions of the State amount to 
Page 9 
reversible error and the judgment of the trial court should be overturned. 
B. Even Under the Less-Stringent Requirements for Civil Traffic Offenses, the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution Demands Courts 
Adhere to Their Own Procedures 
Individuals accused of civil traffic offenses are not entitled to the full scope of 
Constitutional Protections provided to criminal defendants, but they are entitled to the 
fully scope of Constitutional Protections provided to parties in a civil dispute with the 
government. Included in this is the requirement that written procedure be followed. 
In this case, the Defendant was charged with violating a statute that was not in 
force at the time of the incident. The loss of property in this case, while not great, it still 
a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment because the City of Orem did not follow its 
own procedure. 
Appellee acknowledges this error in Response to Sua Sponte Motion for Summary 
Judgment, but claims that this does not amount to reversible error "[b]ecause neither the 
facts of this case or the prosecution's theory ever changed [sic]." Response to Sua 
Sponte Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. This is completely irrelevant. A basic 
understanding of ex post facto laws illustrates that a defendant is not charged under a fact 
pattern or under a theoiy of the case, they are charged under a statute. Fact patterns and 
theories of cases are only tools used to assist the prosecutor in satisfying the statutory 
demands placed upon them. Furthermore, Appellee would have no need to amend their 
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theory of the case as the case was ultimately tried under the wrong statute. This action 
represents reversible error, and the judgment of the trial court should be overturned. 
ERRORS IN THIS CASE AMOUNT TO REVERSIBLE ERRORS 
The errors existing in this case and acknowledged by Appellee in their Response 
are significant, and represent rights strongly protected under the State and Federal 
Constitution. In this case, the Defendant presented evidence, including photo and 
videotape evidence, that the Court could have concluded provided protection for the 
Defendant under the terms of the applicable statute. Instead of evaluating the evidence in 
these terms, however, the Court maintained a dismissive attitude towards this evidence 
more appropriate to the previous statute not in force at the time of the incident. It is 
impossible to say for certain how the Court would have reacted to this evidence, but it is 
certainly reasonable that upon seeing photo and videotape evidence demonstrating that 
the police cars were positioned in such a way to direct traffic into the opposing lane the 
Court may have come to a different conclusion. This is especially true when the 
testifying officer admitted that it could have looked like the police were directing the 
Defendant to take the very course of action he took. 
Because there is sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable Court to conclude that 
the Defendant was justified in his actions under 41-6a-701 (1) (b), the error does not 
amount to harmless error in this case, and the judgment of the Court should be vacated. 
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EVEN IF THIS COURT RULES THAT THE ERRORS IN THIS CASE DO NOT 
AMOUNT TO REVERSIBLE ERRORS, THE DEFENDANT IN THIS 
CASE WAS PARTICULARLY PREJUDICED BY PROSECUTION UNDER 
THE WRONG STATUTE 
Even should this Court find that the changes made represent harmless error in 
general, in the case of a pro se defendant such a change represents reversible error. 
Courts are not to argue law on behalf of the pro se defendant. See e.g. State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). However, the courts are historically and justifiably 
concerned when a pro se defendant is disadvantaged by the legal process rather than the 
law. 
In this case, the Defendant came prepared to defend himself against a specific 
statute with which he had familiarized himself. Changing that statute on the day of trial 
represented a burden in general, but also represented a paiticularly large burden on a pro 
se defendant, who lacks the experience with the legal process to be aware of his legal 
options. The Court made no allowance for the Defendant to prepare for his defense 
against a statute completely different from the one he was prepared to defend himself 
against. Such a "change on the fly" is a difficult thing for most attorneys to accomplish, 
and for a pro se defendant it is nearly impossible. 
Any attempts or preparations made by the Defendant to couch his arguments or 
examinations in terms of the existing statute were made useless by the use of the 
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improper statute. Because of this, the error in this particular case was not harmless even if 
such an error in general would have been harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, for the above mentioned reasons, the APPELLANT asks this 
Court for relief, including the vacating of the judgment of the lower Court. 
DATED this 10 day of February, 2006. 
James H. Brown 
Pro Se Appellant and Defendant 
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ADDENDUM TO APPELLANT BRIEF 
No addendum is necessary. All pertinent information that would appear in the addendum is 
contained either in the court record or quoted verbatim in the appellant brief. 
Dated this 23rd day of February, 2006. 
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